Who Really Owns the Next Shipyard?

Guest perspective. Brian Curry is founder and president of the New Jersey Naval & Maritime Alliance and managing partner of Naval & Maritime Development LLC. This is his second piece for Location Decision, following Where Can America Build More Ships? His full bio and disclosures are at the end.

My earlier Location Decision article examined where America can add qualified shipbuilding capacity. The next question is who will own and finance the facilities that make that production possible.

Recent expansion projects have followed visible demand. Existing builders are adding capacity. New entrants are putting private capital behind new facilities. Public customers and governments are using contracts, industrial-base investments, incentives and financing tools to support more production.

That works when the operator already controls a suitable yard, or when a large company is prepared to develop one. The next increment of capacity may not be that simple.

A qualified shipbuilding site may need deep-water access, heavy power, rail, large fabrication buildings, cranage, environmental work, security, workforce and a production route that connects to a prime yard or customer. A candidate property may already be operating, committed to another use or under redevelopment.

These projects also compete for suitable sites, infrastructure, workers, suppliers and capital. Those inputs need to be secured early enough to support the production schedule.

Recent projects show how demand can support investment. In Maryland, Anduril announced a $3.7 billion private investment in Arsenal-2 at Tradepoint Atlantic alongside a Navy contract worth up to $2.9 billion, with payments linked to production performance. The planned two-million-square-foot facility will make Virginia-class submarine components, with initial operations expected in 2030. Maryland and Baltimore County also announced proposed support of up to 13 percent of anticipated private investment, including capital support for a workforce Center of Excellence. New appropriations require state legislative and county approval. ^[1]

In Texas, Davie Defense received a Coast Guard contract for up to five Arctic Security Cutters, including three planned for domestic construction, and then broke ground on a $1 billion modernization of the Gulf Copper facilities it acquired in Galveston and Port Arthur. ^[2] Saronic is taking another path at the Port of Brownsville. Port Alpha has an announced private investment of more than $3 billion on leased port property, beginning with 835 acres and options to expand to a total footprint of nearly 4,400 acres. The Navy separately selected Saronic as one of three builders for Landing Craft Utility (LCU) 1700 prototypes. ^[3,4]

The pattern matters. Public money has not disappeared. Grants, tax incentives, workforce programs and federal credit remain part of the capital stack. But a defined customer requirement can give the operator, lender and investor something more important: a reason to believe the facility will have work.

There is already an example in Mobile, Alabama. The 355-acre property formerly known as Alabama Shipyard became Mobile Naval Yard following its 2024 acquisition by the United Submarine Alliance Qualified Opportunity Fund. Development partner Redbrick LMD describes the acquisition as a joint venture with CapZone and identifies an anchor investment from the Navy. The U.S. Naval Institute's news service reported at acquisition that Alabama Shipyard would remain a tenant on part of the property while other areas were developed for submarine manufacturing and additional tenants. ^[5]

That is different from a traditional owner-operator shipyard. It separates ownership of the industrial asset from the companies that may use it.

Philadelphia offers another version. Hanwha Philly Shipyard operates on property historically leased through the Philadelphia Shipyard Development Corporation, a government-sponsored nonprofit. The Philadelphia Inquirer reported in September 2026 that the Philadelphia Authority for Industrial Development approved a long-term lease covering 47 additional acres at the Navy Yard for Hanwha's expansion. ^[6]

Brownsville demonstrates a port-landlord structure. Mobile shows how an investment fund can own industrial property while production companies occupy it. Philadelphia also illustrates the use of leased property. Davie represents the more traditional acquisition and owner-operator model.

None is a universal answer, but together they show that a shipbuilder does not necessarily have to own every acre and every piece of shared infrastructure for capacity to be created. Some enabling assets may make more sense as shared infrastructure: training facilities, utilities, rail, heavy-lift access or waterfront improvements that can support several production users over time.

That raises the comparison to the broader industrial real-estate market. Warehousing and manufacturing have spent decades separating the user from the real estate. Developers secure land, build facilities around a tenant's requirement and finance them against long-term leases. CBRE Group's 2026 industrial outlook forecasts more build-to-suit development for specialized occupier requirements while speculative development remains constrained. ^[7]

Shipyard assets bring a different leasing and investment risk.

A distribution building can often be re-leased to another user with manageable changes. A graving dock, heavy-lift quay, panel line or specialized module facility has a narrower group of potential users. The more specialized the asset becomes, the more an investor has to understand the production requirement behind it.

I would underwrite that problem in layers.

First is the demand. What contract, backlog or qualified production requirement will occupy the facility, and for how long?

Second is the asset. Which improvements remain valuable if the original program changes? Deep-water access, power, heavy foundations, rail, large clear-span buildings and shared lifting capacity may support more than one maritime or industrial user. Highly specialized tooling may not.

Third is the operating plan. Who owns the process equipment, who maintains the common infrastructure, and what happens during a production gap?

That last question is where economic development and investment discipline meet.

Shipbuilding projects are often described by the number of jobs created at full buildout. The harder question is whether those jobs and the surrounding supplier base remain productive after the first contract. A facility built around one program can become a strategic asset, or it can become a very expensive stranded asset.

Saronic has publicly framed Port Alpha around both defense and commercial production. That mix could help keep workforce, tooling and infrastructure active if it produces a dependable sequence of orders. The Navy's submarine industrial-base strategy is taking a different but related approach by moving fabrication work to qualified suppliers outside the two primary submarine yards. The Navy reports a broader submarine-enterprise target of nearly 14 million outsourced manufacturing hours by 2030. That remains a target, rather than achieved production. ^[3,5]

These approaches show why investors need to understand both the length of the production pipeline and the facility's ability to serve additional work.

The financing tools will likely be mixed. An operator may fund equipment and working capital. A developer or fund may own the land and reusable improvements. Ports or public development entities may provide long-term site control. States may support infrastructure or workforce. Federal credit can also play a role. The U.S. Maritime Administration (MARAD) offers Title XI financing for eligible shipyard modernization, with terms limited to the lesser of 25 years or the asset's useful life and financing of up to 87.5 percent of eligible capitalizable costs, subject to underwriting. ^[8]

There is also an earlier funding decision. Before construction financing is available, someone has to pay to assemble the project. A property owner, developer or strategic corporate partner may fund a defined development phase to establish site control, engineering, customer fit and costs. The agreement should define the development lead's paid scope, the budget and the funder's participation if the project advances.

The ownership and financing structure should make clear which risks each participant funds and what it receives in return.

That changes how regions should compete for the next shipbuilding investment. A list of available waterfront properties is not enough. Neither is a large customer requirement by itself.

A stated requirement is a starting point. Investors also need to understand the customer's commitment, expected revenue and the cost and timing of delivery.

The investable project is the combination: a defined production requirement, controlled property, infrastructure that can be delivered on schedule, an operator that can perform, a workforce plan, and an ownership and financing structure that still makes sense after the first contract.

The next shipyard may have to be made, not simply found.

The locations that understand that early will be better positioned not only to win the next project, but to keep the capacity productive after the first program is gone.

About the author: Brian Curry is founder and president of the New Jersey Naval & Maritime Alliance (NJNMA) and managing partner of Naval & Maritime Development LLC (NMD). His work focuses on maritime and defense industrial development. The analysis and recommendations here are his own.

Source notes

Checked October 9, 2026. Project figures and milestones below are attributed to the issuing organizations or identified reporting. Announced investment, future operations and production targets remain plans. The ownership, underwriting and development recommendations are the author's analysis. These examples do not establish that another property or financing arrangement is available.

Where is new capacity actually landing? The Location Intelligence Project Tracker follows major U.S. location decisions, including shipyards, defense manufacturing and the suppliers around them, with verified capex, jobs and sources for each.